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Abstract 
Asymmetric information is considered a common issue across E-commerce platforms. Reputation mechanism is 
introduced to solve this problem. By using the transaction data from Taobao, the largest C2C platform in China, this 
paper does empirical study on the relationship between sellers’ reputation and sales. The estimation results show that 
the impact is non-linear. Below the reputation threshold level, sales decrease with improved reputation. Above the 
threshold level, sales increase with improved reputation. Positive feedback ratio, negative feedback ratio and price are 
not the deciding factor on sales. When there are certain factors strengthening trust, sales even have positive 
relationship with price. In the absence of legal framework of reputation, the platform-specific reputation mechanism 
and trading history play the most important role in consumers’ decision process. 
© 2011 Published by Elsevier Ltd. Selection and/or peer-review under responsibility of [CEIS 2011] 
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1. Introduction 
E-commerce continues to grow at an impressive speed around the world. Compared with the “brick-
and-mortar” business model, online transactions are more convenient and cost-effective, which could 
possibly enhance consumer surplus. However, the risk is inherently higher due to the faceless nature of 
electronic transactions. Buyers have no access to the physical goods and largely reply on the product 
description. The information asymmetry may lead to adverse selection and moral hazard problems. 
Buyers have to bear the transaction risk and product quality risk caused by sellers’ uncertain credibility 
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and execution capability. If not addressed properly, it could result in so called “lemon market”. Online 
reputation mechanism is introduced for sake of mitigating the information asymmetry and stimulating the 
development of e-commerce. 
Reputation mechanism related studies have received great attention from scholars in the field of 
economics and management. Previous studies have proved that a seller’s reputation is correlated with 
price and sales volume, mainly by using the data extracted from eBay. Resnick and Zeckhauser(2002) 
find out that 89% of the transactions on eBay is one-shot deal and the credible reputation system will 
significantly affect buyers’ behavior[1]. Ba and Pavlou(2002) empirically prove that the positive feedback 
rate impacts the price premium based on 18 heterogeneous goods[2]. Lucking-Reiley (2000) finds out that 
negative feedbacks play a greater role in shaping the buyer’s willingness to pay and the final transaction 
price [3]. Dewan and Hsu(2004) find that the magnitude of impact of reputation on transaction price is 
not very large. A 10% increase on a seller’s reputation only result in a 0.44% increase of the price[4]. 
Li(2007) is a representative study on the determinants of online transactions in China[5]. He analyzes the 
online reputation mechanism by using the data of Taobao.com and find out non-linear impact of sellers’ 
reputation on sales. Those sellers belonging to Taobao business coalition enjoy higher sales than those 
who do not. Xiao and Liu(2009) investigate the effectiveness of consumer protection plan and 7 day 
return policy based on the transaction record on Taobao[6]. They conclude that the consumer protection 
plan strengthens the trust between buyers and sellers and increases the likelihood of successful 
transaction. By using a game theoretic approach, Wu and Li(2008) proves that sellers with heterogeneous 
reputation can co-exist in the online market because of relatively high search costs[7]. Reputable sellers 
are able to set higher prices while non-reputable sellers set lower prices. 
In short, the reputation mechanism has a positive impact on online market. Given the lack of relevant 
research about China’s online market, we choose to study the online reputation mechanism based on data 
from Taobao, the largest C2C online trading platform in China. The paper is organized as follows: 
Section II introduces the data collection procedure and variable selection. Section III reports the empirical 
estimate results. Section IV concludes the paper. 
2. Data and Variable 
It is widely agreed that the sample selection can affect the estimation result when we study the online 
reputation mechanism. Usually, it is preferred that the goods are homogenous and actively transacted. 
Based on these criteria, we choose the 2G Kingston memory for desktops as our sample. Observations 
from the online C2C platform Taobao.com were collected on March 30 and April 6 of 2011. Data about 
seller’s reputation and transaction history were collected on March 30 while the 7-day sales data were 
collected on April 6. In total, 774 observations were collected over the period, generated from 229 unique 
sellers.
Different from eBay’s auction mechanism, most transactions on Taobao are completed at a pre-
specified fixed price. Therefore, we choose the 7-day sales quantity as the dependent variable. We expect 
that price and shipping costs are inversely related to sales. The seller’s reputation can be measured by the 
overall reputation level, positive feedback ratio and negative feedback ratio. Higher accumulated sales 
quantity is a signal that the seller is credible, which will attract more buyers. So, we include the 30-day 
accumulated sales as an explanatory variable. Given that many buyers place great emphasis on the text 
comment besides the rating score, we incorporate the “text comment ratio” as another explanatory 
variable. Meanwhile, buyers can rate the seller based on the service attitude, product description accuracy 
and delivery speed, so we calculate the average score a seller get from these three perspectives and expect 
it to have a positive impact on the sales.  
4887Li-fang Zhang and Fu-jing Zhang / Procedia Engineering 15 (2011) 4885 – 4889Li-fang Zhang et al / Procedia Engineering 00 (2011) 000–000 3
Also, sellers can choose to join a business coalition on Taobao and theoretically the collective 
reputation will reduce the probability of cheating. It enters the model as a dummy variable and is 
expected to have a positive impact on a seller’s sales. Table 1 provides some explanations of all variables 
in our model. Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for the entire data set. 
Table 1. Variables in the model 
Variable Code Name Expectedsign Explanation 
Dependent
variable quan 7-day sales quantity Sales within 7 days 
Independent 
variable 
price Fixed price - Fixed price of the item 
ship shipping cost - Shipping costs listed by the seller 
texr Text comment ratio + The ratio of text comment among all ratings 
q30 30-day sales + Prior 30-day accumulated sales 
rep Overall reputation level + The overall reputation level of the seller generated form positive, neural and negative rating 
pos Positive feedback ratio + The ratio of positive feedbacks among all ratings on the seller 
neg Negative feedback ratio - The ratio of negative feedbacks among all ratings on the seller 
score Average score + Average score on description accuracy, service and delivery 
coali coalition + Dummy variable: =1 if the seller belongs to a coalition;  =0 otherwise 
Table 2 Descriptive statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std.Dev. Min Max Median 
quan 229 3.380 11.32 0 100 0
price 229 139.0 24.72 92 325 142 
ship 229 12.48 4.483 0 45 12 
q30 229 82.30 263.1 0 2186 1
rep 229 8.755 1.848 3 14 9
coali 229 0.0306 0.173 0 1 0
texr 229 0.221 0.260 0 1 0.192 
score 229 4.782 0.0792 4.600 5 4.8 
neg 229 0.00564 0.0350 0 0.500 0
pos 229 0.995 0.00543 0.964 1 0.997 
3.  Estimation Results 
We estimate a wide variety of specifications. Livington(2005) indicate that reputation has a non-linear 
impact on sales[8]. From the scatter diagram, we detect that the relationship is actually in the shape of 
Parabola, so the reputation variable to the second power is entered in logarithmic form. Meanwhile, in 
order to address the possibility of zero sales during the observing period, the 7-day sales quantity plus one 
are entered in logarithmic form. The same logic applies to the shipping cost and 30-day accumulated 
sales. Model 1 includes only price, shipping cost, reputation level, reputation to the second power (plus a 
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constant). Other models introduce the additional variables defined above. Table 3 reports the estimation 
results from several different specifications, with p values in parentheses. 
Table 3 Estimation results 
Dependent Variable：ln(quan+1) 
variables Model1 Model2 Model3 Model4 Model5 Model6 Model7 Modep8 Model9 Model10
ln(price) -1.307*** -1.431*** -1.306*** -1.215*** -1.311*** -1.350*** -1.406*** 0.0729 0.0212 0.0225 
(0.287) (0.305) (0.288) (0.288) (0.288) (0.314) (0.319) (0.279) (0.282) (0.283) 
Ln(ship+1) -0.0174 -0.0135 -0.0152 -0.0110 -0.0180 -0.0144 -0.0117 -0.0894 -0.0859 -0.0856 
(0.0976) (0.0976) (0.0978) (0.0968) (0.0978) (0.0973) (0.0972) (0.0776) (0.0774) (0.0777) 
ln(rep) -13.73*** -13.87*** -13.68*** -13.51*** -13.73*** -13.63*** -13.71*** -7.982*** -8.044*** -8.037***
(1.603) (1.605) (1.608) (1.593) (1.605) (1.607) (1.602) (1.370) (1.365) (1.371) 
ln(rep)^2 3.944*** 3.968*** 3.930*** 3.878*** 3.942*** 3.919*** 3.930*** 2.240*** 2.245*** 2.243***
(0.409) (0.409) (0.410) (0.407) (0.410) (0.411) (0.410) (0.359) (0.357) (0.359) 
pos 11.47 8.104 8.223 8.254 
(9.427) (10.12) (8.033) (8.058) 
neg -0.796 -0.318 -0.0599 -0.105 
(1.370) (1.388) (1.103) (1.104) 
texr 0.407** 0.377** 0.380** -0.0244 -0.0226 -0.0231 
(0.186) (0.188) (0.188) (0.154) (0.153) (0.154) 
coali 0.174 0.146 0.161 0.0955 0.110 0.111 
(0.277) (0.276) (0.276) (0.219) (0.219) (0.220) 
ln(score) 3.529 2.628 2.065 1.033 0.982 
(3.296) (3.485) (2.622) (2.770) (2.827) 
ln(q30+1) 0.296*** 0.296*** 0.296***
(0.0260) (0.0259) (0.0260) 
constant 18.17*** 7.526 18.11*** 17.43*** 18.19*** 12.66** 6.392 3.395 -2.820 -2.783 
(1.985) (8.965) (1.991) (1.997) (1.989) (4.880) (9.001) (3.962) (7.190) (7.216) 
Obs 229 229 229 229 229 229 229 229 229 229 
R2 0.497 0.500 0.498 0.508 0.498 0.512 0.513 0.693 0.694 0.694 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
The coefficient on ln(rep) and ln2(rep) are statistically significant across all models, which proves that 
reputation does have a non-linear impact on sales. Take model 9 as an example, the coefficient of ln(rep) 
is -8.048 and that of ln2(rep) is 2.247. It means that for a seller with the average reputation level of 8.755, 
ln(quan+1) increases 0.21 with one unit increase of reputation level. Put differently, the sales will 
increase by 23.37% with one unit increase of reputation level. 
Meanwhile, based on the estimation results, we calculate the threshold value of reputation level, which 
is around 6 for all specifications. If the reputation level is lower than 6, sales will decrease when the 
reputation level goes up. If the reputation level exceeds 6, sales will increase when the reputation level 
goes up. In other words, the reputation has to reach certain level of critical value before it can function as 
expected. Besides overall reputation level, positive feedback ratio and negative feedback ratio also reflect 
a seller’s reputation. Across different specifications, the sign of their coefficients is consistent with 
expectation but statistically insignificant. The possible explanation is that the variance of positive 
feedback and negative feedback ratio are small, so that buyers do not pay much attention to these two 
numbers when making decisions.  
Next, we will discuss the estimation results of other variables in different specifications. Model 1 
through model 7 shows that price is inversely related to sales. The price elasticity is around -1.3, which 
means sales decrease 1.3% with 1% price increase. After adding ln(q30+1) into the model, the coefficient 
of price is positive but statistically insignificant. It implies that when other factors such as past sales 
history strengthen buyer’s trust on the seller, a bit higher price will not deter buyer’s purchase. Across all 
specifications, the coefficient of ln(ship+1) is negative but statistically insignificant. It is possibly due to 
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the correlation between price and shipping cost. According to some sophisticated sellers on Taobao, they 
sometimes try to attract more buyers by lowering the listed price but increase the listed shipping cost. In 
model 8, 9 and 10, the coefficient of 30-day sales is positive and statistically significant, which is 
consistent with our expectation. This result can well explain why many sellers try to boost this number by 
manipulating false transactions. The coefficient of text comment ratio is not always statistically 
significant. The reason might be that the ratio itself does not convey a clear message. Text comments 
could be a positive signal or negative signal. We also find out that the text comment ratio across different 
sellers converges with the accumulation of sales after a period of time.  
The collective reputation is a stronger signal, which can boost the sales of business coalition members. 
In Model 5 through 10, the coefficient of coalition dummy variable is positive and statistically significant, 
which is consistent with our expectation. The coefficient of average score based on description accuracy, 
service and delivery is positive but statistically insignificant. The reason might be the little variance of 
this score across sellers. From our 229 observations, the mean of this average score is 4.78, while the 
minimum value is 4.6 and maximum value is 5.  
In summary, the estimation results show that the overall reputation level and the 30-day accumulated 
sales are the major factor affecting a seller’s current sales. The impact of reputation on sales is non-linear, 
where the threshold value is around 6. Price has a negative impact on sales, but is not the most significant 
factor. Positive feedback ratio and coalition member have a positive impact on sales, but statistically 
insignificant. Shipping costs and negative feedback ratio have a negative but statistically insignificant 
impact on sales.  
4. Conclusion 
The majority of prior studies focus on the relationship between reputation and price, based on data 
from eBay. Our paper studies the impact of reputation on sales, given that most of transactions are 
completed at a fixed price on Taobao in China. We find that the relationship is non-linear. When the 
seller’s reputation level is below certain threshold value, the sales are negatively influenced by reputation. 
When the seller’s reputation level exceeds certain critical value, better reputation certainly help to boost 
the sales. For online C2C platform, such as Taobao, price is not the major determinant of sales anymore. 
Reputation and past trading record are more relevant in buyers’ decision-making process. Some other 
factors, such as business coalition, may also play a role in shaping consumers’ trust, but are not the 
deciding factor yet.
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